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promisor was under a duty to pay, regardless of the coercion, it is stated
that the pressure exerted is insufficient to constitute duress. Thus, the
rationale in terms of duress would seem to be ex post facto.
The principal case appears to have been decided upon like consid-
erations and to have been rationalized in a similar manner. Since such
considerations of policy seem to 'be basic, opinions would be clarified
if rationalized in terms of such fundamental factors. Discussion of
duress would then be rendered unnecessary.
J. WILLIAM COPELAND.
Disbarment-Acts Not in Capacity of Attorney Antedating
Incorporated Bar-Constitutionality.
The defendant was disbarred by the Council of the North Carolina
State Bar, for collecting and wrongfully retaining funds belonging to
an estate for which he was acting as trustee, executor and attorney,
under a clause of the State Bar Act, Ch. 210, Public Laws 1933, author-
izing disbarment for "detention without a bona fide claim thereto of
property received or money converted in the capacity of attorney."
Upon appeal, the disbarment was sustained by the Superior Court and
a jury. On appeal to the Supreme Court, held, reversed on the grounds
(1) that the acts complained of were committed while the defendant
was acting in the capacity of an executor and not as an attorney;
(2) all the matters complained of took place prior to the enactment of
the State Bar Act in 1933; and (3) "It must be conceded that the plea
to the jurisdiction presents a grave and serious constitutional question."1
Unless specified by statute, it is not necessary that an attorney be
acting only in his professional capacity when the acts complained of are
committed. Any showing of lack of the good moral character necessary
for an officer of the court is a sufficient basis for the revocation of an
attorney's license.2 Disbarments have been sustained where the offense
complained of was participation in a lynching,8 participation in an un-
lawful assembly and jailbreak,4 conviction of adultery, t violation of pro-
hibition laws,6 receiving stolen goods while acting in the capacity of
'in-re Parker, 209 N. C. 693, 184 S. E. 532 (1936).
2 Bar Assoc. v. Meyerovitz, 278 Ill. 356, 116 N. E. 189 (1917) ; Bar Assoc. v.
Fulton, 284 Ill. 385, 120 N. E. 252 (1918) (where there was a failure to account
for moneys entrusted to an attorney as trustee or where there was a misappropri-
ation, the-court held that lack of good moral character was sufficient to warrant
disbarment).
'Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 2 Sup. Ct. 569, 27 L. ed. 552 (1882).
'State v. Graves, 73 Ore. 331, 144 Pac. 484 (1914).
'Grievance Committee v. Borden, 112 Conn. 269, 152 Atl. 292 (1930) ; Note
(1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 506.
'I re Callicate, 57 Mont. 297, 187 Pac. 1019 (1920); State v. Johnson, 14
N. C. 345, 93 S. E. 847 (1916) (where the defendant habitually violated prohibition
laws).
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pawn broker,7 keeping a disorderly house and selling opium,8 making
exorbitant charges for a legislative appearance,9 using the mails to de-
fraud,10 false representations knowingly made about property which the
attorney was selling,11 and where a district attorney accepted a campaign
fund for his re~lection from an indicted person.1 2 In cases where the at-
torney was acting as a financial fiduciary disbarments have been sustained
where the funds of an employer were misappropriated,' 8 where the at-
torney was acting as guardian,1 4 as a receiver in bankruptcy,15 as ad-
ministrator,' 0 where property entrusted to him was misappropriated,17
because of conversion of moneys entrusted to him by another lawyer to
pay incidental costs of litigation,' 8 and because of a refusal to turn
over moneys received in satisfaction of a judgment.19 For these rea-
sons the findings of the Council and of the Superior Court that the
defendant converted the funds while acting in the capacity of attorney
for the estate should not have-been upset merely because the earlier
civil judgment for restitution against him and his surety, upon which
the findings largely rested, was grounded upon his misconduct as
executor.
Nor should it have been fatal that the offense occurred prior to the
enactment of the State Bar Act.2 0 The clause quoted from that act
under which the proceeding in question was started is a re-enactment
of the substance of a cause for disbarment which was in force at the
time of the misconduct as a part of the old disbarment statute.21 The
main effect of the new legislation is to change the machinery for this
type of proceeding, although it also creates additional grounds as a basis
7Petition of Law Association of Phila., 228 Pa. 331, 135 Atl. 732 (1927).8In re Marsh, 42 Utah 186, 129 Pac. 411 (1913).
I1n re Carey, 146 Minn. 80, 177 N. W. 801 (1920).
" In re Crane, 182 Cal. 707, 189 Pac. 1072 (1920).
"in re Stimer, 171 Minn. 437, 214 N. W. 652 (1927).
" In re Crum, 55 N. D. 945, 215 N. W. 682 (1927).
3In re Wilson, 79 Kan. 674, 100 Pac. 635 (1909) ; lit re Washington, 82 Kan.
829, 109 Pac. 700 (1910) ; Assoc. of Bar v. Chappe, 131 App. Div. 328, 115 N. Y.
Supp. 868 (1909).
"ARe Swaender, 5 Ohio Dec. 598, 7 Ohio N. P. 446 (1895).
1In re Litchenberg, 169 App. Div. 505, 155 N. Y. Supp. 482 (1915).
"In re Ward, 106 Wash. 147, 179 Pac. 76 (1919).
27In re Condon, 157 Minn. 24, 195 N. W. 492 (1923).
"In re Casey, 208 App. Div. 24, 203 N. Y. Supp. 61 (1924).
State v. Kaufman, 202 Iowa 157, 205 N. W. 321 (1926). For a case allowing
disbarment because of exorbitant charges, see In re Sanitary District Attorneys,
351 Ill. 206, 186 N. E. 332 (1933) ; Note (1934) 18 MniN. L. REv. 217. For an
article on acts involving moral turpitude which gives rise to disbarment, see Brad-
vay, Moral Turpitude as the Criterion of Offenses that Justify Disbarment (1935)
24 CALin. L. REv. 9.
"In re Winne, 208 Cal. 35, 280 Pac. 113 (1929) (where the state bar investi-
gated and took action on matters which happened before the enactment of the
statute incorporating the bar).
"C. S. (1919) §206.
376 THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
for disbarment.22 Even in cases where a statute is criminal, its sub-
sequent incorporation into a new act does not suspend the effect of the
law as originally enacted. 23 Consequently, there is no opportunity for
invoking any ex post facto doctrine.
The character of disbarment proceedings is not criminal, but on the
contrary is essentially civil, or even sui genwris, in the majority of juris-
dictions.24 The primary purpose is not to punish the offender, but to
protect the courts, the public, and the profession from persons unfit to
practice.2 5 In cases where the statute of limitations would prevent a
criminal prosecution for acts that amount to a crime, disbarment pro-
ceedings, because of their civil nature, based on the same acts, may be
instituted.2 0  Even where a person has been pardoned for an act, the
same act may later be the basis of disbarment proceedings. 27 This is
based either on the theory that the attorney has ceased to possess that
degree of good character that was necessary for his admission to prac-
tise, or on the theory that the lack of integrity makes him unfit to be
entrusted with legal matters.28 No matter what the purpose or nature
'A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1933 (1933) 11 N. C.
L. REv. 191, commenting on the changes in the statute.
' State v. Williams, 117 N. C. 753, 23 S. E. 250 (1895) ; Wood v. Bellamy, 120
N. C. 212, 27 S. E. 113 (1897) ; State v. R. R., 125 N. C. 65, 34 S. E. 106 (1899);
State v. Hollingsworth, 206 N. C. 739, 175 S. E. 99 (1934).
Philbrook v. Newman, 85 Fed. 139 (C. C. D. Colo. 1898) ; Maloney v. State,
182 Ark. 510, 32 S. W. (2d) 423 (1930) ; it re Vaughn, 189 Cal. 491, 209 Pac.
353 (1920) ; State v. Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 91 Atl. 274 (1914) ; Gould v. State, 99
Fla. 662, 127 So. 309 (1930) ; People v. Stonecipher, 171 Ill. 506, 111 N. E. 496
(1916) ; it re Smith, 73 Kan. 743, 85 Pac. 584 (1906) ; Bar. Assoc. v. Scott, 209
Mass. 200, 95 N. E. 402 (1911) ; In re Ebbs, 150 N. C. 44, 63 S. E. 190 (1908) ;
In re Breidt, 84 N. J. Eq. 222, 94 Atl. 214 (1915); Notes (1931) 10 N. C. L. REV.
58; (1921) 9 CALIF. L. REV. 484; 6 C. J. 602; 2 R. C. L. 1109.
Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 2 Sup. Ct. 569, 27 L. ed. 552 (1882) ; Mc-
Intosh v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 261, 294 Pac. 1067 (1930) ; In re Vaughn, 189 Cal.
491, 209 Pac. 353 (1922) ; Gould v. State, 99 Fla. 662, 127 So. 309 (1930) ; In re
Kerl, 32 Idaho 737, 188 Pac. 40 (1920) ; Bar. Assoc. 'V. Greenhood, 168 Mass. 169,
46 N. E. 568 (1897) ; In re Breidt, 84 N. J. Eq. 222, 94 AtI. 244 (1905) ; In re
Rous, 221 N. Y. 81, 116 N. E. 782 (1917) ; In re Egan, 52 S. D. 394, 218 N. W. 1
(1928) ; In re Stalen, 193 Wis. 602, 214 N. W. 379 (1927) ; State v. Kearn, 203
Wis. 178, 223 N. W. 629 (1930); Note (1921) 5 MiNN. L. REv. 14; 2 R. C. L.
1088; 8 C. J. 602.
'In re Danforth, 157 Cal. 425, 108 Pac. 332 (1910); cf. li re Ulmer, 268
Mass. 373, 167 N. E. 749 (1929); Joseph v. Manrix, 133 Ore. 329, 288 Pac. 407
(1930). For a note discussing the applicability of the Statute of Limitations to
disbarment proceedings, see (1920) 7 A. L. R. 93.
- Nelson v. Comm., 128 Ky. 779, 109 S. W. 337 (1908); In re Sutton, 50
Mont. 88, 145 Pac. 6 (1914) ; In re E, 65 How. Pr. 171 (N. Y. 1879) ; In re
Attorney, 86 N. Y. 563 (1881) ; Johnston v. State, 174 N. C. 345, 93 S. E. 847
(1917) (where a conditional pardon was no bar); Petition of Law Assoc. of
Phila., 288 Pa. 331, 135 Atl. 732 (1927) (leading case).
'lin re Haymond, 121 Cal. 385, 53 Pac. 899 (1898) ; Bar Assoc. v. Cantrell, 49
Cal. App. 468, 193 Pac. 598 (1920) ; Iowa v. Mosher, 128 Iowa 82, 103 N. W. 105(1905) (cases where the attorney ,had ceased to have the same degree character
essential to admission); State v. Johnson, 142 Iowa 462, 128 N. W. 837 (1910)
(where the test was whether the defendant still -possessed sufficient integrity to
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of the proceedings is, it is of course necessary to give effect to the
fundamental essentials and requirements of due process. 29 Therefore,
unless the act was committed in the presence of the court,8 0 sufficient
notice and opportunity to be heard and explain or defend the charges
must be granted,31 plus the right of appeal to a court of last resort.
3 2
As balanced against these fundamentals it is not a denial of due process
in these proceedings to comment on the refusal of the accused to take
the stand and testify in his own behalf by saying it raises an inference
of guilt, 83 although a presumption of innocence in favor of the defend-
ant exists when the proceedings start.34 There is no vested right
whereby the accused is entitled to be faced by witnesses, and depositions
may be used wherever proper in civil cases.3 5
The objection to the constitutionality of the State Bar Act on the
ground that in effect it denies the jury trial that it professes to grant by
providing that the procedure on appeal to the Superior Court must con-
form to that followed in consent references, seems without foundation.35'
There are some states, including North Carolina, which specifically pro-
vide by statute for a jury during some phase of the proceedings ;36 but
handle legal matters); Iowa v. Rohrig, 59 Iowa 725, 139 N. W. 908 (1913);
Cowley v. O'Connell, 174 Mass. 253, 53 N. E. 1001 (1899); In re Mills, 1 Mich.
392 (1850).
People v. Love, 298 Ill. 304, 131 N. E. 809 (1921) ; Bar Assoc. v. Sleeper,
251 Mass. 6, 146 N. E. 269 (1925) ; In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 1152(1918). See also State v. Winburn, 206 N. C. 923, 175 S. E. 498 (1934) which
holds that the privilege of practicing is a right which may only be deprived by ajudgment of the court.
People v. Turner, 1 Cal. 143 (1850) ; In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 67 Atl.
497 (1907); Warren v. Connolly, 165 Mich. 274, 130 N. W. 637 (1911); It re
Eldridge, 82 N. Y. 161 (1880) ; State v. Root, 5 N. D. 487, 67 N. W. 590 (1896).
it re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E. 646 (1899) ; People v. Kavanaugh, 220 Ill.
49, 77 N. E. 107 (1906) ; Hanson v. Grattan, 84 Kan. 843, 115 Pac. 646 (1911) ;
In re Davies, 93 Pa. St. 121 (1880) ; Ex parte Steinman, 95 Pa. St. 220 (1880).
' McIntosh v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 261, 294 Pac. 1067 (1930) ; Herron v. State
Bar, 212 Cal. 196, 298 Pac. 474 (1931) ; Burns v. State, 213 Cal. 151, 1 P. (2d)
989 (1931). See also State Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 118 N.
J. Eq. 504, 179 Atl. 116 (1935) (where it was stated that in the absence of con-
stitutional or statutory requirements a notice or hearing before an administrative
body was not necessary to due process, because the guaranty of judicial review
was sufficient).
n McIntosh v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 261, 294 Pac. 1067 (1930) ; Fish v. State Bar,
214 Cal. 215, 4 P. (2d) 937 (1931); Notes (1923) 11 CAY.. L. Rv. 137; (1923)
24 A. L. R. 863, discussing applicability in disbarment proceedings of the consti-
tutional -privilege of not testifying against oneself.
3IIn re Haymond, 121 Cal. 385, 53 Pac. 899 (1898) ; In re Parsons, 35 Mont.
478, 90 Pac. 163 (1907) ; In re Nenby, 82 Neb. 235, 117 N. W. 691 (1908) ; It re
Attorney, 175 App. Div. 653, 161 N. Y. Supp. 504 (1916); In re Riley, 75 Okla.
192, 183 Pac. 728 (1919) ; Note (1920) 7 A. L. R. 93.
'In re Vaughn, 189 Cal. 491, 209 Pac. 353 (1922) ; Fish v. State Bar, Cal.,
214 Cal. 215, 4 P. (2d) 937 (1931) ; People v. Stonesipher, 271 Ill. 506, 111 N. E.
496 (1916) (emphasizing not criminal proceedings).
Ex parte Thompson, 228 Ala. 118, 152 So. 229 (1933) (Ala. State Bar Act
not invalid for authorizing disbarment by board without jury).
'Ibid. These include Ark., Ga., Ind., La., Tex., and Wyo.
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in the absence of such a statute no such right exists at common law.37
Congress has never attempted to enact any legislation on this point, and
the federal courts, feeling it was not necessary to due process, have
never allowed the use of a jury in this type of proceeding. 8 Where
such statutes exist, they are constitutional, as they do not infringe on
any inherent power of the court.8 9 The verdict of the jury is not
merely advisory, but it has the same effect as in any other civil case.40
However, where such statutes exist, they are followed only as a matter
of courtesy in a great many instances. 41 This is undoubtedly due to
some extent to the fact that a jury is not always a feasible unit in this
type of proceeding, because the ideas of laymen regarding the standards
of ethics are often, due to business practises, as in cases of solicitation,
at a wide variance with those of the legal profession.4 2 It has been
suggested that in order to circumvent this difficulty, the jury should be
limited to making special findings of fact.43
Within the last few years there has been a marked increase in the
number of bar associations that have incorporated for the purpose of
regulating admission and disbarment as well as to function as a unit in
otherwise protecting the public and the profession. 44 Such corporations
'because of their functions and titles are necessarily public ones within
'Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 2 Sup. Ct. 562, 27 L. ed. 552 (1882) ; In re
Adair, 34 F. (2d) 663 (D. C. Del. 1929) ; Ex parte Robinson, 3 Ind. 52 (1851) ;
In re Norris, 60 Kan. 649, 57 Pac. 528 (1899) ; State v. Fouchey, 106 La. 743, 31
So. 325 (1901) ; In re Carver, 224 Mass. 169, 112 N. E. 877 (1916) ; In re Shep-
hard, 109 Mich. 631, 67 N. W. 971 (1896); Burnes Case, 1 Wheel. Crim. 503
(N. Y.); Dean v. Stone, 2 Okla. 13, 35 Pac. 578 (1894); State Bar Comm. v.
Sullivan, 38 Okla. 26, 131 Pac. 703 (1912); State v. Rossman, 53 Wash. 1, 101
Pac. 357 (1909) ; Note, Ann. Cas. 1913 D 1162.
'Ex parte Burr, 22 U. S. 529, 6 L. ed. 152 (1824) ; Ex Parte Secombe, 60 U. S.
9, 15 L. ed. 565 (1856) ; Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 2 Sup. Ct. 562, 27 L. ed.
552 (1882) ; It re Boone, 83 Fed. 944 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1897) ; Potts, Trial by
Jury in Disbarment Proceedings (1933) 11 TEx. L. Ray. 28.
"State Law Examiners v. Phelan, 43 Wyo. 481, 5 P. (2d) 263 (1931); Note
(1932) 78 A. L. R. 1323.
"0State Law Examiners v. Phelan, 43 Wyo. 481, 5 P. (2d) 263 (1931).
41 COSTIGAN, CASES ON LEGAL ETHics (2nd ed. 1933) 163.
'Potts, Jury Trial in Disbarment Proceedings (1933) 11 TEx. L. REv. 28.
3 Note (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 738. In case the evidence is uncontroverted, the
judge may direct a verdict as in any other civil case tried by a jury. Weirnmont
v. State, 101 Ark. 210, 142 S. W. 194 (1911).
"Statutes incorporating the bar. ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) §§6220-6239;
Ariz. Session Laws 1933, c. 66; CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) act 591; IDAHO
CODE ANN. (1932) §§3-401 to 3-417; Ky. REv. STAT. (Baldwin Supp. 1934)
§101-1; La. Acts (2nd Ext. Sess.) 1934, no. 10, p. 70; MicH. Comr. LAWS (Mason
Supp. 1935) §13603-1; Miss. GEN. LAW 1932 c. 121; NEVADA Comp. LAW (Hillyer,
1929) §§540-590; N. M. ST. ANN. §§9-201-9-212; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935)
§§215 (1)-215 (18); N. D. Comp. LAws ANN. (Supp. 1925) §§81341-81345;
Okla. Laws 1929 c. 264; Oregon Laws 1935 c. 28; S. D. Lavs 1931 c. 84; UTAH
REv. ST. (1933) §§6-0-1 to 6-0-23; WAsH. Ray. ST. (Remington Sup. 1934)
§§138-1 to 138-17.
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the meaning of the constitutional provisions against creating private
corporations by special act of the legislature. 45 The constitutionality
of the North Carolina organization was not passed on in the instant
case, although the question was raised. The previous North Carolina
decisions, however, are in line with those in the majority of jurisdic-
tions in holding that the legislature may prescribe reasonable rules and
regulations applicable to the admission and disbarment of attorneys, so
long as they do not infringe on any inherent power of the court.46 They
have emphasized the fact that the judiciary is not shorn of all its power
over disbarment by virtue of the statutes, but to the contrary there is
recognition that two separate methods exist, to wit: (1) the legislative
and (2) the judicial.47 Prior to the State Bar Act, the legislative
method provided for disbarment by the Superior Court and a jury, on
evidence furnished by the Bar Association and on charges prosecuted
by the solicitor, with an appeal to the Supreme Court. Today, under
the new act, with the old statutory grounds only slightly revised, the
Council disbars, with an appeal to the Superior Court and thence to the
Supreme Court. In two recent cases the Supreme Court has exercised
its inherent right to disbar on its own initiative-the judicial method-
the charges usually being made by the Attorney General.4 8 Thus there
is no basis for fearing that the State Bar Act has deprived the courts
of any of their original or supervisory control over disbarment pro-
ceedings. In recognizing the validity of legislative regulations in this
field, the courts hold that a cordinate authority exists between the legis-
lative and judicial branches of the government. 49 It has been sug-
"State Bar v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. 323, 278 Pac. 342 (1929) ; In re Scott,
53 Nev. 24, 292 Pac. 291 (1930). For a case showing there is no unconstitutional
delegation of either legislative or judicial power, see Brydonjack v. State Bar,
208 Cal. 439, 281 Pac. 1018 (1929).
"In re Bailey, 30 Ariz. 407, 248 Pac. 29 (1926) ; It re Spriggs, 36 Ariz. 262,
248 Pac. 1521 (1930) ; In re Lavine, 2 Cal. (2d) 324, 41 P. (2d) 161 (1935) ; In
re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 53 N. E. 646 (1899) ; Iit re Opinion of Justice, 279 Mass. 607,
180 N. E. 725 (1932) ; It re Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N. W. 179 (1929) ;
In re Richards, 339 Mo. 907, 63 S. W. (2d) 672 (1933) ; RX parte Schenck, 65
N. C. 354 (1871) ; In re Applicants for License, 143 N. C. 1, 55 S. E. 635 (1906) ;
Ex parte Ebbs, 150 N. C. 44, 63 S. E. 190 (1916) semble; It re Branch, 70 N. J.
L. 537, 57 Atl. 431 (1904) In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 1152 (1918).
'Committee v. Strickland, 200 N. C. 630, 158 S. E. 110 (1931) ; In re Stiers,
204 N. C. 48, 167 S. E. 382 (1932).
"Attorney General v. Gorson, 209 N. C. 320, 183 S. E. 392 (1935) ; Brummitt
v. Winborn, 206 N. C. 923, 175 S. E. 498 (1935).
" Ex parte Secombe, 60 U. S. 9, 15 L. ed. 565 (1856) ; Ex parte Garland, 71
U. S. 333, 379, 18 L. ed. 366 (1866) ; Ex parte Coleman, 54 Ark. 235, 15 S. W.
470 (1891) ; Brydonjack v. State Bar, 208 Cal. 439, 281 Pac. 1018 (1929) ; Car-
penter v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 358, 295 Pac. 23 (1931) ; It re, Taylor, 48 Md. 28(1877) ; In re Opinion of Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N. E. 725 (1932) ; State v.
Johnson, 171 N. C. 799, 88 S. E. 437 (1916) ; Committee v. Strickland, 200 N. C.
630, 158 S. E. 110 (1931) ; It re Olmstead, 292 Pa. 96, 140 Atl. 634 (1928) ; In re
Barclay, 82 Utah, 288, 24 P. (2d) 302 (1933) ; Board v. Phelan, 43 Wyo. 481, 5
P. (2d) 263 (1931).
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gested that this co-authority exists as a matter of comity between the
two branches of the government, and that it is a recognition by the
court that both departments should function because it is not clear that
either should have exclusive control.50
Incidentally, the State Bar Act was not constitutionally weakened by
the provision that51 "neither a councillor nor any officer .. .of the
State Bar shall be deemed as such to fie a public officer as that phrase
is used in the Constitution or laws of the State of North Carolina."
That was merely an ineffectual 52 attempt to prevent an attorney from
being ineligible to serve as an officer or councillor under the dual office-
holding ban of the state constitution, "3 in case he also happened to be a
notary public54 or county commissioner.
With respectful deference, it is submitted that the Council and
Superior Court in the principal case could have been affirmed on all
three grounds. Such a ruling would have been equally fair to the
defendant and more in the public interest.
B. IRvIN BOYLE,
M. T. VAN HECKE.
Evidence-Dying Declarations in North Carolina.
The North Carolina courts have recognized dying declarations as
competent evidence since 1815.1 The bases of this exception to the
general rule that all testimony must be given under oath and subject to
cross examination are that this kind of evidence is necessary and espe-
cially trustworthy. Even though other witnesses are available, still if
the deceased's information is to be availed of, his hearsay utterances
must be received. Moreover, in many cases the deceased was the only
witness, and a refusal to admit his statements would permit his assailant
to escape. Further, this type of declaration is especially trustworthy
' headle, Inherent Power of Judiciary Over Admittance to the Bar (1932) 7
WAs H. L. REv. 320; Green, The Court's Power over Admission and Disbarment(1925) 4 TEx. L. REv. 1; Lee, Constitutional Power of Courts over Admission to
Bar (1899) 13 HARv. L. REv. 233, 251; Bradway, Moral Turpitude as the Criterion
of Offenses that Justify Disbarment (1935) 24 CALM. L. REv. 9. See also STATE
BAR AcTs ANN. (1934 ed.) ; Note (1932) 16 MINN. L. REv. 857.5
'N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §255 (3).
'Attorney-General v. Knight 169 N. C. 335, 85 S. E. 418 (1915) (GeneralAssembly is without power to declare a public office is not such an office).
"Art. XIV, §7.
'Harris v. Watson, 201 N. C. 661, 161 S. E. 215 (1931).
The earliest case in which a dying declaration was admitted in evidence was
McFarland v. Shaw, 4 N. C. 200 (1815). In an earlier case, State v. Moody, 3
N. C. 31 (1798), the court refused to admit a dying declaration. Stone, J., said,
"How is it possible that a man can be a witness to prove -his own death ?" An-
other early case in which a dying declaration was held to be competent is State v.
Poll, 8 N. C. 442 (1821).
